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Abstract
We study binary classification algorithms for which the prediction on any point is not too sensitive to
individual examples in the dataset. Specifically, we consider the notions of uniform stability (Bousquet
and Elisseeff, 2001) and prediction privacy (Dwork and Feldman, 2018). Previous work on these notions
shows how they can be achieved in the standard PAC model via simple aggregation of models trained
on disjoint subsets of data. Unfortunately, this approach leads to a significant overhead in terms of
sample complexity. Here we demonstrate several general approaches to stable and private prediction
that either eliminate or significantly reduce the overhead. Specifically, we demonstrate that for any
class C of VC dimension d there exists a γ-uniformly stable algorithm for learning C with excess error
α using O˜(d/(αγ) + d/α2) samples. We also show that this bound is nearly tight. For ε-differentially
private prediction we give two new algorithms: one using O˜(d/(α2ε)) samples and another one using
O˜(d2/(αε) + d/α2) samples. The best previously known bounds for these problems are O(d/(α2γ)) and
O(d/(α3ε)), respectively.
1 Introduction
For a domain X and Y = {0, 1}, let A be a randomized learning algorithm that given a dataset S ∈ (X×Y )n
outputs a predictor h : X → Y . We consider algorithms that for every x, y, Prh∼A(S)[h(x) = y] is not
sensitive to individual examples in S. More formally, we say thatA is an (ε, δ)-differentially private prediction
algorithm [DF18] if for any pair of datasets S and S′ that differ in a single example and every (x, y) ∈ X×Y
we have
Pr
h∼A(S)
[h(x) = y] ≤ eε · Pr
h∼A(S′)
[h(x) = y] + δ.
The setting when ε = 0 is equivalent to the δ-uniform stability1[BE02].
Stability is a classical approach for understanding and analysis of generalization bounds [RW78; DW79;
BE02; SSSSS10; FV19]. In practice, stability-inducing methods such as Bagging [Bre96] and regularization
[BE02; SSSSS10] are used to improve accuracy and robustness to outliers.
Prediction privacy was defined by Dwork and Feldman [DF18] to study privacy-preserving learning in
the setting where the description of the learned model is not accessible to the (potentially adversarial) users.
Instead the users have access to the model through an interface. For an input point the interface provides
the value of the predictive model on that point. Bassily, Thakkar, and Thakurta [BTT18] consider the same
setting while focusing on algorithms for answering multiple queries to the interface by aggregating multiple
non-private learning algorithms. Many of the existing ML systems, such as query prediction in online search
and credit scores, are deployed in this way. At the same time, as demonstrated in a growing number of
works, even such black-box exposure of a learned model presents significant privacy risks for the user data
[SSSS17; LBG17; TLGYW18; CLKES19].
∗Part of the work was done while the author was at Google Research.
†Part of this work was done while the author was visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing.
1Alternatively, uniform stability can be considered for algorithms that output a model ϕ : X → [0, 1] that gives the confidence
level at x. It is easy to see [EEP05], that our discussion and results extend to this setting by defining ϕ(x) := Eh∼A(S)[h(x)].
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For comparison, the standard setting of privacy-preserving learning aims to ensure that the model learned
from the data is produced in a differently private way. Thus this approach preserves privacy even when a
potential adversary has complete access to the description of the predictive model. The downside of this
strong guarantee is that for some learning problems, achieving the guarantee is known to have substantial
additional costs, both in terms of sample complexity and computation.
Another application of algorithms with private predictions is for labeling public unlabeled data. Training
on data labeled in this way gives a differentially private learning algorithm [HCB16; PAEGT17; PSMRTE18;
BTT18]. It is also easy to see that these notions of stability ensure some level of protection against targeted
data poisoning attacks [BNL12] in which an attacker can add examples to the dataset with the goal of
changing the prediction on a point they choose.
Given the significant benefits of these notions of stability and privacy it is natural to ask what is the
overhead of ensuring them. We will address this question in the classical context of learning a class of
Boolean functions in the (agnostic) PAC learning framework [Val84; Hau92; KSS94]. Namely, for a class H
of Boolean functions over X , we say that A is an (α, β)-agnostic PAC learning algorithm for H if for every
distribution D over X × Y , given a dataset S of i.i.d. examples from D, A outputs a hypothesis h that with
probability at least 1− β over the choice of S satisfies:
Pr
(x,y)∼D,h∼A(S)
[h(x) 6= y] ≤ inf
f∈H
{
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[f(x) 6= y]
}
+ α.
Namely, the excess error is at most α. In the realizable setting it is additionally known that there exists
f ∈ H such that for all (x, y) in the support of D, y = f(x).
A simple, general, and well-known approach to improve stability is via averaging of models trained on
disjoint subsets of data. Alternatively, one can pick a random subset of the dataset and run the algorithm
on that subset. Clearly, this technique improves stability by a factor k at the expense of using k times more
data. It was used in an influential work of Shalev-Shwartz, Shamir, Srebro, and Sridharan [SSSSS10] to
demonstrate that learnability of H implies existence of a uniformly stable algorithm for learning H and,
to the best of our knowledge, this is the only known technique for learning an arbitrary class H of finite
VC dimension with uniform stability. An unfortunate disadvantage of this technique is that it substantially
increases the sample complexity. In particular, it uses O(d/(γα2)) samples to learn a class of VC dimension
d with uniform stability γ and excess error α (the dependence on β is logarithmic and thus we set it to a
small fixed constant). By the same argument, in the realizable case O(d/(γα)) samples suffice.
A somewhat more careful aggregation and analysis are needed to achieve privacy since naive averaging
does not improve the ε parameter. In the realizable case O˜(d/(αε)) samples are known to suffice (and this is
tight), but in the agnostic case the best known bound was O˜(d/(α3ε)) [DF18; BTT18]. An additional factor
of α results from the need to add some noise in the aggregation step while ensuring that it contributes at
most α to the excess error.
For comparison, we note that ensuring that the entire model is produced with differential privacy cannot,
in general, be done using a number of samples polynomial in d. For example, threshold functions on a line
have VC dimension of 1 but require an infinite number of samples to learn with privacy [FX15; ALMM19].
The only general approach for PAC learning with differential privacy is the technique of Kasiviswanathan,
Lee, Nissim, Raskhodnikova, and Smith [KLNRS11] that is based on the exponential mechanism [MT07].
This approach leads to sample complexity of O(log(|H |)/(αε)+d/α2) (in this bound log(|H |) can be replaced
with the representation dimension [BNS13a] of H which can sometimes be lower than log(|H |)).
1.1 Our contribution
We describe several new algorithms for agnostic PAC learning of arbitrary VC classes that significantly
reduce the overheads of achieving stability and privacy of predictions. We first show a simple and natural
algorithm that is γ-uniformly stable and is a (α, β)-agnostic PAC learner with the nearly optimal sample
complexity of O˜(d/(γα) + d/α2).
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Theorem 1. For every class H of VC dimension d and α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a γ-uniformly stable
(α, β)-agnostic PAC learning algorithm with sample complexity of
n ≤ O
(
d log(1/α)
γα
+
d+ log(1/β)
α2
)
.
This bound is tight up to poly-logarithmic factors. First, a lower bound of n = Ω((d + log(1/β))/α2)
holds for any (α, β)-agnostic PAC algorithm (not necessarily stable). Secondly, we prove that n = Ω(d/(γα))
is required even for the realizable setting. The proof of the lower bound is based on a similar bound for
private prediction algorithms [DF18, Theorem 2.2] and appears in Section 5.
One way to interpret this bound is that α-uniform stability can be achieved essentially “for free”, that
is, using asymptotically the same number of samples as is necessary for learning. In contrast, known general
approaches for achieving stability do not give any non-trivial guarantees without increasing the sample
complexity by at least a factor of 1/γ [SSSSS10].
This uniformly stable algorithm easily implies existence of an (ε, 0)-differentially private prediction learn-
ing algorithm with sample complexity of O˜(d/(εα2)). This step can be done using the aggregation technique
in [DF18] but we give an even simpler conversion.
Corollary 1. For every class H of VC dimension d and α, β, ε ∈ (0, 1), there exists an (α, β)-agnostic PAC
learning algorithm with ε-differentially private prediction that has sample complexity of O˜(d/εα2).
This bound implies that for ε = Ω(1), ε-differentially private prediction can be achieved without increasing
the sample complexity (asymptotically).
One limitation of the bound in Corollary 1 is that it only improves on learning with differential privacy
when α is sufficiently large. Specifically, the sample complexity of ε-DP (α, β)-agnostic PAC learning is
O˜(r/(αε) + d/α2), where r is the representation dimension of H [BNS13a]. Thus Corollary 1 gives a better
bound than samples complexity of ε-DP learning only when α ≥ d/r (for most known classes of functions H ,
r = Θ(log(|H |)) [FX15]). The only known result in which learning with ε-private prediction requires fewer
samples than ε-DP learning for all α is the algorithm for learning thresholds on a line with sample complexity
of O˜(1/(εα)+1/α2) [DF18]. Note that the VC dimension of this class is 1 while the representation dimension
is Θ(log |X |).
Our main technical results is the first general bound that for a number of classes improves on ε-DP
(α, β)-agnostic PAC learning in all parameter regimes. Specifically, we describe an algorithm with sample
complexity O˜(d2/(εα) + d/α2):
Theorem 2. For every class H of VC dimension d and α, β, ε ∈ (0, 1), there exists an (α, β)-agnostic PAC
learning algorithm with ε-differentially private prediction that has sample complexity of
n ≤ O˜
(
d2
εα
+
d
α2
)
.
For comparison, ε-DP learning of linear threshold functions over Bd, where B ⊆ R has sample complexity
of Θ(d2 log(|B|)/(εα) + d/α2) [FX15]. Thus the first term in our bound is better by a factor of log(|B|).
Another example is the class consisting of (the indicator function of) lines on a plane over a finite field GF (p).
Its VC dimension is 1 while its representation dimension is Θ(log p) [FX15]. Thus our bound is better by
a factor of log p. Although these gaps are typically small, we believe that there is an important conceptual
difference between bounds in terms of size of H and those depending on the VC dimension, as apparent also
in the classical learning theory. In particular, the latter enables to argue about infinite hypothesis classes.
The best known lower bound for the problem is Ω(d/(εα) + (d + log(1/β))/α2) [DF18, Theorem 2.2].
Thus the bound in Theorem 2 is tight with respect to ε and α, however, there is a gap in the dependence
on d. Closing this gap is an interesting open problem.
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Overview of the techniques: The algorithm we use to prove Theorem 1 combines two standard tools.
We pick a random subset T of S of size O˜(d/α), or approximately a γ fraction of S. Classical results in
VC theory imply that T is an α-net for H with high probability. We can therefore use it to define an
α-cover HT of H that has size of at most (1/α)
O(d). We then we use the exponential mechanism over HT
as in [KLNRS11]. The random choice of the subset T ensures that each example has small influence on
the choice HT and the exponential mechanism ensures that each example has small influence on the final
output function. We remark that similar uses of an exponential mechanism over a data-dependent cover
have appeared in prior work on differentially private learning [CH11; BNS13b; BNS15] but we are not aware
of any prior use of these tools to ensure uniform stability.
The above stable algorithm can be converted to a differentially private prediction algorithm (Corollary
1). In order to do so, we simulate it with γ = εα and, in addition, randomly flip the output label with
probability α. This additional noise increases the error by at most α. At the same time it ensures that
both 0 and 1 are output with probability at least α. In particular, the additive guarantee of εα implies a
multiplicative guarantee of at most (α+ εα)/α = 1 + ε ≤ eε.
Next, we describe the second differentially private algorithm, from Theorem 2 The first step also uses
an exponential mechanism over a cover defined using a random subset of S. The function output by this
step is used to re-label S, and the result is used as a training set for the private prediction algorithm in the
realizable case from [DF18]. The bound on the sample complexity of this algorithm relies on a substantially
more delicate analysis of the differential privacy of the exponential mechanism when the set of functions it is
applied to changes, combined with the effect of privacy amplification by subsampling [KLNRS11]. Although
final step of the algorithm and some elements of the proof are borrowed from the general technique of
[BNS15], new techniques and ingredients are required to derive the final bound. A more detailed outline of
the analysis can be found in Section 4.1.
An alternative way to derive Corollary 1 is to use the general relabeling approach for converting a
realizable PAC learning algorithm to an agnostic one [BNS15]. The algorithm and the analysis resulting
from this approach are more involved than our proof of Corollary 1 (we use elements of this approach in the
proof of Theorem 2). This approach has been communicated to us by Nissim and Stemmer [NS18] and has
been the starting point for this work. The details of this technique can be found in an (independent) work of
Nandi and Bassily [NB19] which applies this result for answering multiple prediction queries with privacy.
2 Preliminaries
Notation: We denote byX the domain, and by Y = {0, 1} the label set. We useH to denote the underlying
hypothesis class of functions from X to Y will use d to denote the VC dimension of H . The dataset is
denoted by S = ((xi, yi))
n
i=1, and the underlying distribution is denoted by D. Define [n] = {1, . . . , n}. For
any I ⊆ [n], denote SI = ((xi, yi))i∈I . Given a hypothesis h : X → Y , denote the expected zero-one error of
h by LD(h) := Pr(x,y)∼D[h(x) 6= y] and the empirical error of h by LS(h) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 1h(xi) 6=yi . We use C to
denote positive universal constants.
Agnostic PAC learning: A learning algorithm receives a training set S ∈ (X × Y )n and outputs a
hypothesis A(S) : X → Y . We also consider randomized learning algorithms, and define the corresponding
loss as LD(A(S)) := Pr(x,y)∼D,h∼A(S)[h(x) 6= y] (and LS(A(S)) is defined analogously). Given α, β ∈ (0, 1),
we say that A is (α, β)-agnostic PAC learner for H if for every distribution D over X × Y ,
Pr
S∼Dn
[
LD(A(S)) ≤ inf
h∈H
LD(h) + α
]
≥ 1− β.
Uniform stability and prediction privacy: A γ-uniformly stable (or, γ-stable for brevity) learner is a
learner whose prediction probabilities at every point change by at most an additive γ when one example in
S is changed. Formally, for any S, S′ ∈ (X × Y )n which differ in at most one example and any x ∈ X and
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y ∈ Y ,
Pr
h∼A(S)
[h(x) = y] ≤ Pr
h∼A(S′)
[h(x) = y] + γ.
The notion of differentially private prediction [DF18] is an application of the definition of differential
privacy [DMNS06] to learning in the setting where the only output that is exposed to (potentially adversarial)
users is predictions on their points. Formally, given ε, δ ≥ 0, we say that an algorithm A gives (ε, δ)-private
prediction if
∀S, S′, x, y : Pr
h∼A(S)
[h(x) = y] ≤ eε Pr
h∼A(S′)
[h(x) = y] + δ.
Postprocessing guarantees of differential privacy imply that any learning algorithm that outputs a predictor
with (ε, δ)-differential privacy also gives (ε, δ)-private prediction. We say that an algorithm gives ε-private
prediction when δ = 0. Note that any ε-private algorithm is (eε − 1)-stable and (0, δ)-private prediction is
exactly the same as δ-stability.
Deterministic notation for randomized hypotheses: Assume that a randomized learning algorithm
outputs a hypothesis h : X → {0, 1}. Throughout the formal analysis, instead viewing the prediction of h on
some point x as random variable, we will describe it by its expectation. That is, we say h(x) = p instead of
Pr[h(x) = 1] = p. Assume that a randomized algorithm outputs a random hypothesis h, where h equals hi
with probability pi, for i = 1, . . . , N . Viewing hypotheses as functions from X to [0, 1], one can equivalently
write h =
∑N
i=1 pihi. The expected loss can then be defined as LD(h) = E(x,y)∼D |h(x)− y|.
Comparing functions (h  g): For two functions h, g : X → [0, 1], we write h  g if for any x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y , h(x) ≤ g(x). Note that in this notation, the condition of (ε, δ)-private prediction is equivalent to
A(S)  eε · A(S′) + δ.
2.1 Technical preliminaries
Nets for VC classes: Fix α ∈ (0, 1), a hypothesis class H and a distribution D over X × Y . Given a
subset A ⊆ X , we say that A is an α-net for H with respect to D if it satisfies the following: any h, h′ ∈ H
that satisfy h(x) = h′(x) for all x ∈ A, also satisfy Pr(x,y)∼D[h(x) 6= h
′(x)] ≤ α. We say that A is an α-net
for H with respect to S if it is an α-net with respect to the uniform distribution over S. The following is a
fundamental theorem in machine learning (see, e.g. [SSBD14, Section 28.3]).
Lemma 1. Let D be a distribution over X × Y , fix α, β ∈ (0, 1), and let U be a set of n′ = O((d log(1/α) +
log(1/β))/α) i.i.d. samples from D. Then, with probability at least 1−β, U is an α-net for H with respect to
D. Furthermore, this holds also if the samples are selected without replacement (namely, re-sampling from
D until one gets n′ distinct elements).
Note that this theorem is usually stated for i.i.d. samples with replacement. However, since repetitions
do not matter for the definition of ε nets, one can only gain from sampling without replacement.
The class HT of all possible labelings of a subset T ⊆ X × Y : Given a subset T ⊆ X × Y , we will
create a hypothesis class HT in the following manner: define an equivalence relation ∼T over H , by h ∼T g if
h(x) = g(x) for all (x, y) ∈ T . Then, HT will contain one representative from each equivalence class (chosen
arbitrarily).
The growth function and the Sauer-Shelah lemma: Given a hypothesis class H , the growth function
of H is defined as τn(H) := supA⊆X : |A|=n |HA|. The well-known Sauer-Shelah lemma states (see, e.g.,
[SSBD14, Lemma 6.10]):
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Lemma 2. For any hypothesis class H of VC dimension d and n > d+ 1,
τn(H) ≤
d∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
≤ (em/d)d.
Uniform convergence bounds: The following is a standard uniform bound on the estimation error of a
hypothesis class H (e.g. [SSBD14, Theorem 6.8]):
Lemma 3. Fix α, β ∈ (0, 1) and assume that n ≥ Ω((d+ log(1/β))/α2). Then,
Pr
S∼Dn
[∀h ∈ H, |LD(h)− LS(h)| ≤ α] ≥ 1− β.
The exponential mechanism: The exponential mechanism is a well-known ε-differentially private al-
gorithm for selecting a candidate that approximately maximizes some objective that has low sensitivity
[MT07]. Following [KLNRS11] we apply it to a hypothesis class H , dataset S and privacy parameter ε.
Namely AexpH,ε(S) samples h ∈ H with probability proportional to exp(−nLS(h)ε/2). It is ε-differentially pri-
vate (in the usual sense of [DMNS06]) and, in particular, it gives ε-private predictions. The utility guarantees
for the expected function can for example be found in [SU17].
Lemma 4. The exponential mechanism AexpH,ε gives ε-private predictions. Additionally, for any α ∈ (0, 1)
and S ∈ (X × Y )n, if n ≥ 2 ln(|H |)/(εα) then
LS(A
exp
H,ε(S)) ≤ inf
h∈H
LS(h) + α.
Privacy amplification by subsampling: The following lemma is an adaptation of the standard privacy
amplification-by-sampling technique [KLNRS11] to private prediction.
Lemma 5. Let A′ be an algorithm operating on a sample of size n′ = ηn for η ∈ (0, 1) and let A be the
following algorithm that receives a sample of size n:
1. Select a uniformly random subset T ⊆ S of size n′.
2. Run A′ on T .
For any ε ∈ (0, 1), if A′ gives ε-private prediction then A gives 2εη-private prediction.
Private prediction in the realizable setting: Dwork and Feldman [DF18, Theorem 4.1] have shown
that O˜(d/(εα)) samples suffice to learn with private prediction in the realizable setting (that is when there
exists h ∈ H with zero error).
Lemma 6. For any ε, α, β and H, there exists an (α, β)-PAC learner with ε-private prediction ARε,α,H for
distributions realizable by H with sample complexity of n = O˜(d/(αε)).
3 Uniform Stability of PAC Learning
In this section we describe the uniformly stable PAC learning algorithm, prove a (nearly) matching lower
bound on its sample complexity and derive the corollary for private prediction.
For convenience, we start by restating Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 (Thm. 1 restated). For every class H of VC dimension d and α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a
γ-uniformly stable (α, β)-agnostic PAC learning algorithm with sample complexity of
n = O
(
d log(d/α)
γα
+
d+ log(1/β)
α2
)
.
We outline the algorithm and its analysis below. The details of the proof appear in Section 3.1.
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Proof outline: The algorithm consists of two steps:
• Given the dataset S of size n, randomly select a subset T ⊆ S of size |T | = γn/2, and create the
hypothesis class HT , as defined in Section 2.1 (HT contains all classifications of H on T ). Note that
HT satisfies the following properties:
1. With high probability,
inf
h∈HT
LS(h) ≤ inf
h∈H
LS(h) + α/3. (1)
This follows from the fact that T = Ω˜(d/α), hence it is an α/3 net for H , with respect to the
uniform distribution over S (Lemma 1).
2. From Sauer-Shelah lemma (Lemma 2), the cardinality of HT is upper-bounded by |HT | ≤ O(n
d).
• We run the exponential mechanism (from Section 2.1) on the set of hypothesis HT evaluated on the set
of examples S and denote the selected hypothesis by hˆ. We set the privacy parameter to γ/4 to ensure
that the algorithm is (eγ/4− 1)-stable. Hence it is γ/2-stable. By Lemma 4, |S| = O(log |HT |/(γα)) =
O˜(d/(γα)) suffices to ensure that
E
hˆ∼Aexp
HT ,ε
[LS(hˆ)] ≤ inf
h∈HT
LS(h) + α/3. (2)
The algorithm has excess error of at most α: combining Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), we get that with high probability
over the choice of T , Ehˆ∼Aexp
HT ,ε
[LS(hˆ)] ≤ infh∈H LS(h)+2α/3, and from uniform convergence we obtain that
Ehˆ∼Aexp
HT ,ε
[LD(hˆ)] ≤ infh∈H LD(h) + α, with high probability over the choice of S and T . Next, we claim
that it is γ-stable: assume that S and S′ are two training sets that differ in one example. This example has
a probability of at most γ/2 to appear in T and affect the creation of HT . Additionally, the exponential
mechanism is γ/2 stable. Composing the stability bounds from both steps we obtain that algorithm is
γ-stable as desired.
The tightness of the upper bound is implied by the following lower bound.
Theorem 4. Let H be a class of functions of VC dimension d. Fix α ≤ 1/4. Assume that there exists
a PAC learning algorithm A that is γ-stable and for any realizable distribution D over X × Y , namely
ES∼Dn [LD(A(S))] ≤ α. Then, n ≥ (d− 1)/(8γα).
The proof follows the same structure as the proof of Theorem 2.2 in [DF18] and appears in Appendix 5.
Prediction privacy via stability: We now observe that any γ-stable (α, β)-PAC learning algorithm for
γ = αε/2 can be converted to a (2α, β)-PAC learning algorithm with ε-private prediction simply by flipping
the predictions with probability α.
More formally, the algorithm consists of the following two steps:
1. Run the γ-stable algorithm from Theorem 1 with γ = εα/2 and approximation parameter α, and let
h′ be the output hypothesis.
2. Given a point x ∈ X , predict h′(x) with probability 1− α and 1− h′(x) with probability α.
Let A denote the obtained algorithm. Note that for any S ∈ (X×Y )n, x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , Pr[A(S)(x) =
y] ≥ α. Additionally, A is εα/2-stable. It follows easily from the definition that A gives ε-private prediction.
Thus we obtain Corollary 1.
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3.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The algorithm receives as an input a training set S and a point x ∈ X , and outputs y ∈ {0, 1} as a prediction
for x defined below:
1. Select a uniformly random subset I ⊆ [n] of size n′, where n′ ∈ [n] is a parameter to be defined later
(n′ should be thought of as n′ ≈ γn).
2. Create the hypothesis class HSI containing all possible labelings of SI , as defined in Section 2.1.
3. Execute the exponential mechanism AexpHSI ,γ
(S) with privacy parameter γ on the sample S to randomly
select a hypothesis hS,SI ∈ HSI , and output hS,SI (x).
We proceed with the formal definition. First, for any S ∈ (X × Y )n and T ∈ (X × Y )n
′
, define
hS,T = A
exp
HT ,γ
(S), viewing hS,T as a function from X → [0, 1]. Note that we do not require T ⊆ S in this
definition. Next, define
Asta(S) :=
1(
n
n′
) ∑
I⊆[n] : |I|=n′
hS,SI .
The final prediction of the algorithm given x ∈ X is Asta(S)(x).
We are ready to state the main lemma:
Lemma 7. Let Nnetα,β,d denote the smallest number n
′ that suffices for Lemma 1 to hold, given parameters
α, β and d (the minimal size required for a random set to be an α-net with probability 1 − β). Let N expk,ε,α
denote the sample complexity required for ε-differentially private exponential mechanism to be α-approximate
given a hypothesis class of size k. Assume that
n′ ≥ Nnetα,α,d; n ≥ N
exp
τn′(H),γ,α
; n ≥ n′/γ.
Then
LS(A
sta(S))− inf
h∈H
LS(h) ≤ 3α
and Asta is 3γ-stable.
First, we prove Theorem 1 using Lemma 7, and then we prove this lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1. Given α, β and γ, we will show an algorithm with the desired sample complexity. It
suffices to find an algorithm which is O(γ)-stable and (O(α), O(β))-agnostic PAC. To do so, we apply the
above algorithm Asta with parameter n′ = Nnetα,α,d, and then select n as the smallest integer which satisfies
the conditions of Lemma 7.
We apply Lemma 7 to get a bound on the empirical error of Aγ(S) and then apply uniform convergence
to generalize to the data distribution. In particular, from Lemma 3, with probability 1− β over S,
LD(A
sta(S)) ≤ LS(A
sta(S)) + α ≤ inf
h∈H
LS(h) + 4α ≤ inf
h∈H
LD(h) + 5α.
Lastly, we prove Lemma 7:
Proof of Lemma 7. First we prove 3α-approximation. From the condition that n ≥ N expτn′(h),ε,α
, for any I,
LS(hS,SI ) ≤ min
h∈HSI
LS(h) + α.
Since n′ ≥ Nnetα,α,d, with probability at least 1− α over the choice of I:
min
h∈HSI
LS(h) ≤ inf
h∈H
LS(h) + α.
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Thus,
LS(A
sta(S)) =
1(
n
n′
) ∑
I⊆[n] : |I|=n′
LS(hS,SI ) ≤ α+
1(
n
n′
) ∑
I⊆[n] : |I|=n′
min
h∈HSI
LS(h) ≤ inf
h∈H
LS(h) + 3α.
Now we prove the 3γ-stability. Let S be a sample and let S′ be obtained from S by replacing one sample.
Without loss of generality we can assume that S′ is obtained by removing (x1, y1) from S and adding (x
′
1, y
′
1).
Our goal is to show that Asta(S)  Asta(S′) + 3γ.
For any T , Lemma 4 implies that
hS,T  e
γhS′,T ≤ (1 + 2γ)hS′,T ≤ hS′,T + 2γ,
using the inequality ex ≤ 1 + 2x for x ≤ 1. To conclude the proof, using the fact that n′/n ≤ γ,
Asta(S) =
1(
n
n′
) ∑
I⊆[n] : |I|=n′
hS,SI 
1(
n
n′
) ∑
I⊆[n] : |I|=n′
hS′,SI + 2γ
=
1(
n
n′
) ∑
I⊆[n]\{1} : |I|=n′
hS′,SI +
∑
I⊆[n] : |I|=n′,1∈I
hS′,SI + 2γ
 Asta(S′) +
n′
n
+ 2γ  Asta(S′) + 3γ.
Remark 1. It is possible to slightly improve the bound in Theorem 1, replacing log(d/α) with log(1/α). In
order to do so, one has to replace HSI with an α-net, namely, a set GSI of hypotheses from H which satisfies:
∀h ∈ H, ∃g ∈ GSI , s.t. |{(x, y) ∈ SI : h(x) 6= g(x)}| ≤ α|I|.
There exists such a set of cardinality (1/α)O(d). Using this set, one can relax the requirement n ≥ N expτn′(H),γ,α
from Lemma 7 to n ≥ N exp
1/αO(d),γ,α
, and the improved bound would follow.
4 PAC Learning with Prediction Privacy
In this section we describe our main technical result for private prediction. Our algorithm is the first general
algorithm that can PAC learn an arbitrary class H of VC dimension d with the (nearly) optimal dependence
of the sample complexity on ε and α. However the dependence on the dimension d is quadratic. More
formally, we prove the following upper bound on the sample complexity of the problem.
Theorem 5 (Theorem 2 restated). For every class H of VC dimension d and α, β, ε ∈ (0, 1), there exists
an (α, β)-agnostic PAC learning algorithm with ε-differentially private prediction that has sample complexity
of
n ≤ O˜
(
d2
εα
+
d
α2
)
.
We present the algorithm and the outline of its analysis below. Additional technical details are given in
Section 4.2.
4.1 Overview of the algorithm and its analysis
The algorithm that achieves the claimed sample complexity is described below (with slight simplifications
for the clarity of exposition):
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• The first steps are similar to those of the stable algorithm: we draw a random subset T ⊆ S and then
select, using the exponential mechanism, a hypothesis hˆ ∈ HT . The only difference is that T is now
selected to be of size |T | = O(ε|S|) (rather than O(γ|S|)) and the privacy parameter of the exponential
mechanism is now set to be min(ε/2, d/(α|S|)) (rather than γ/4).
• In the second step, we “privatize” hˆ by defining ϕ(hˆ) as follows:
1. Let Shˆ denote the set of examples obtained by labeling the points in S with hˆ, namely, Shˆ :=
{(x, hˆ(x)) : (x, y) ∈ S}.
2. Feed Shˆ to the PAC learner for the realizable setting with private prediction (from Lemma 6),
and denote the output hypothesis as ϕ(hˆ). The privacy guarantee of this realizable learner is set
to d/(α|S|) and the approximation guarantee is O(α). Note that given hˆ, the hypothesis ϕ(hˆ) is
randomly selected (as the corresponding learner is randomized).
3. Given a point x ∈ X , predict ϕ(hˆ)(x).
Note that since Shˆ is realized by hˆ, then ϕ(hˆ) is very close to hˆ: informally speaking, Pr(x,y)∼D[hˆ(x) 6=
ϕ(hˆ)(x)] ≤ O(α).
We first establish that the algorithm is an (α, β)-PAC learning algorithm. As in the analysis of the stable
algorithm, E[LD(hˆ)] ≤ infh∈H LD(h) + O(α). By the guarantees of the PAC learner for the realizable case
we get that E[LD(ϕ(hˆ))] ≤ LD(hˆ) +O(α) ≤ infh∈H LD(h) +O(α).
Next, we explain why the algorithm gives ε-private prediction. Denote by hS,T the random hypothesis
output given a training set S and a fixed subset T : hS,T is obtained by first selecting hˆ from HT using the
exponential mechanism and then learning ϕ(hˆ). Note that hS,T is a random variable, since the outputs of
both the exponential mechanism and the private learner ϕ are random. For the analysis, we extend the
definition of hS,T to sets T which are not necessarily subsets of S. Our goal is to show that for any x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y ,
Pr
T⊆S,hS,T
[hS,T (x) = y] ≤ e
ε Pr
T ′⊆S′,hS′,T ′
[hS′,T ′(x) = y], (3)
where the probability is both over the selections of the subsets T and T ′ and over the random selections of
hS,T and hS′,T ′ . We split Eq. (3) in two, first comparing hS,T with hS,T ′ and then hS,T ′ with hS′,T ′ : for any
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ,
Pr
T⊆S,hS,T
[hS,T (x) = y] ≤ e
ε/2 Pr
T ′⊆S′,hS,T ′
[hS,T ′(x) = y]; and (4)
Pr
T ′⊆S′,hS,T ′
[hS,T ′(x) = y] ≤ e
ε/2 Pr
T ′⊆S′,hS′,T ′
[hS′,T ′(x) = y]. (5)
Eq. (5) follows from the fact that for any fixed T ′, hS,T ′(x) is the composition of two private algorithms:
first, the exponential mechanism selects hˆ privately, and then ϕ(hˆ)(x) is a private prediction given any fixed
hˆ.
Next, we sketch the proof of Eq. (4). The terms in both sides of the inequality can be calculated as follows:
first T and T ′ are randomly drawn as subsets of S and S′, respectively. Then, the random predictions hS,T (x)
and hS,T ′(x) are made. Due to this structure, we can use privacy amplification by sub-sampling (Lemma 5)
2
to compare hS,T (x) with hS,T ′(x). In particular, we prove that hS,T (x) is O(1)-private as a function of T ,
and since |T | = O(ε|S|), the sub-sampling boosts the privacy by a factor of O(ε) and Eq. (4) follows. Hence,
we are left with proving that hS,T (x) is O(1)-private as a function of T :
Pr
hS,T
[hS,T (x) = y] ≤ e
O(1) Pr
hS,T ′
[hS,T ′(x) = y], (6)
2To prove Eq. (4), one cannot use Lemma 5 as stated. However, the proof in our case is analogous.
10
for (almost) any T and T ′ that differ on one element.
To prove Eq. (6), we fix T and T ′ that differ in one element and create a matching between the elements of
HT and the elements of HT ′ , such that for any matched pair h ∈ HT and h
′ ∈ HT ′ , the following properties
hold:
• |LS(h)− LS(h
′)| ≤ α/d.
• For any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , Pr[ϕ(h)(x) = y] ≤ eO(1)Pr[ϕ(h′)(x) = y], where the probability is over the
random selections of ϕ(h) and ϕ(h′).
These two properties imply that Pr[hS,T (x) = y] is within constant factors of Pr[hS,T ′(x) = y]: the first
property ensures that the probability to select h from HT via the exponential mechanism is within a constant
factor from the probability to select h′ from HT ′ (for any matched h and h
′). The second property states
that Pr[ϕ(h)(x) = y] and Pr[ϕ(h′)(x) = y] are within a constant factor from each other. Hence, Eq. (6)
follows from these two properties, and it remains to describe why they hold.
• First, we define the aforementioned matching between HT and HT ′ : h ∈ HT is matched with h
′ ∈ HT ′
if and only if h(x) = h′(x) for all (x, y) ∈ T ∩ T ′. Note that this is not a one-to-one matching, but
any h ∈ HT can be matched with either one or two elements from HT ′ (and similarly any h
′ ∈ HT ′ is
matched with one or two elements from HT ).
• We apply Lemma 1 on η-nets, substituting U = T ∩ T ′ and η = α/d. We obtain that T ∩ T ′ is an
α/d-net for H with respect to the uniform distribution over S (with high probability over a random
selection of T ). Any pair of matched hypotheses satisfy h(x) = h′(x) for all (x, y) ∈ T ∩ T ′, hence, by
definition of η-nets, they satisfy
|{(x, y) ∈ S : h(x) 6= h′(x)}| ≤ |S|α/d. (7)
• The first property, namely |LS(h)− LS(h
′)| ≤ α/d, follows immediately from Eq. (7).
• For the second property, recall that ϕ(h) is the output of a learner with d/(α|S|)-private prediction,
trained on {(x, h(x)) : (x, y) ∈ S}. Eq. (7) implies that the training sets used to train ϕ(h) and ϕ(h′)
differ on at most α|S|/d examples. Applying the privacy guarantee α|S|/d times (referred to as group
privacy), one obtains that Pr[ϕ(h)(x) = y] ≤ (ed/(α|S|))α|S|/dPr[ϕ(h′)(x) = y] = ePr[ϕ(h′)(x) = y],
as required. The second property holds, and the proof follows.
4.2 Detailed proof
We will start by describing an algorithm which gives (O(ε), O(εα))-private prediction (namely, (ε, δ)-privacy
with δ = O(εα), see Section 2). We then convert it to an algorithm with O(ε)-private prediction as in the
proof of Corollary 1.
The algorithm receives a training set S and a point x ∈ X , and outputs a label y for x. It is defined as
follows:
1. Select a subset I ⊆ [n] of size |I| = n′ uniformly at random (n′ is a parameter to be defined later, and
should be thought of as n′ ≈ εn).
2. Create the hypothesis class HSI , as defined in Section 2.1 (HSI contains all the different prediction
patterns of hypotheses from H on SI).
3. Draw a random h ∈ HSI using the exponential mechanism with loss evaluated on S and privacy
parameter 2/(ηn), where η > 0 is a parameter to be defined later (should be thought of as ε/d).
4. Define the dataset Sh as the predictions of h on S, Sh := ((xi, h(xi)))
n
i=1 (where (xi, yi) is the i’th
sample from H). Recall that ARε,α,H denotes the realizable private learner from Lemma 6 with privacy
ε and approximation error α (we will ensure that the sample size is sufficiently large to achieve these
guarantees). Let ϕS(h) := A
R
1/(ηn),α,H(Sh) denote the learned hypothesis given the sample Sh.
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5. Output ϕS(h)(x).
Viewed as a deterministic function the hypothesis output by this algorithm is described as follows. First, for
any S ∈ (X × Y )n and T ∈ (X × Y )n
′
(not necessarily T ⊆ S), define:
hS,T =
1
Z
∑
h∈HT
λhϕS(h), where λh = exp (−LS(h)/η) and Z =
∑
h∈HSI
λh. (8)
Then, for any S, define
hS :=
1(
n
n′
) ∑
I⊆[n] : |I|=n′
hS,SI . (9)
We now summarize the conditions that need to be satisfied to prove the main result.
Lemma 8. For α, β, ε ∈ (0, 1) and a positive integer d, define the following values:
• Let Nnetα,β,d be the smallest sample size such that for any distribution D and any hypothesis class H
of VC dimension d, a random i.i.d. sample of size Nnetα,β,d is an α-net for H with probability 1 − β.
Lemma 1 gives that Nnetα,β,d = O((d log(1/α) + log(1/β))/α).
• Let NRε,α,β,d denote the smallest sample size such that with probability 1− β over the choice of S:
∀h ∈ H, E
(x,y)∼D
[|h(x) − ϕS(h)(x)|] ≤ α, (10)
where ϕS(h) is obtained from h by applying the PAC learner with private prediction for the realizable
case. As we explain in Remark 2, NRε,α,β,d is essentially the same as the sample complexity stated in
Lemma 6, and equals O˜(d/(εα)).
• Let N expε,α,k denote the sample size required for the ε-differentially private exponential mechanism to be
α-approximate for any hypothesis class of size k. Lemma 4 implies that N expε,α,k ≤ 2 ln(k)/(εα).
• Let NGα,β,d denote the sample size required to ensure that for any hypothesis class H of VC dimension
d, with probability 1− β over the choice of the training set S:
∀h ∈ H, |LD(h)− LS(h)| ≤ α.
Standard uniform convergence bounds (Lemma 3) give NGα,β,d = Θ((d+ log(1/β))/α
2).
Recall that τn(H) is the growth function of H, defined in Section 2.1. Let n
′ and η be parameters such that
the following holds:
n ≥ NGα,β,d; n
′ ≥ Nnetα,α,d; n
′ ≥ Nnetη,α,d + 1; n ≥ N
exp
2/(ηn),α,τn(H)
; n ≥ NR1/(ηn),α,d; n
′ ≤ εn; ε ≥ 1/(ηn).
Then, the hypothesis hS defined in Eq. (9) above gives (O(ε), O(εα))-private predictions. Additionally, for
any set S,
LD(hS) ≤ inf
h∈H
LD(h) +O(α),
with probability 1− β.
Remark 2. We briefly explain why NRε,α,β,d = O˜(d/(εα)). In Theorem 4.1 in [DF18] shows that this
sample complexity is sufficient for the existence of a PAC learning algorithm with ε-DP prediction for the
realizable setting. This implies that for any fixed h, with probability 1 − β over the choice of S labeled by
h, E(x,y)∼D[|h(x) − ϕS(h)(x)|] ≤ α. In our case, we apply the algorithm to Sh, where h depends on S.
Therefore we need the learning result to hold for all possible ways to label S by h ∈ H. Namely, that with
probability ≥ 1− β, for all h ∈ H, E(x,y)∼D[|h(x)− ϕS(h)(x)|] ≤ α.
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The proof in [DF18] relies on having a (non-private) (α, β)-PAC learner with sample complexity O((d+
log(1/β))/α2). In order for the stronger statement in Eq. (10) to hold, all we need is a non-private (α, β)-
PAC learner that succeeds for all h ∈ H at the same time. Namely, that with probability ≥ 1 − β over a
random sample S of size Θ˜(d/α) for all h ∈ H the algorithm, given Sh outputs g that satisfies Prx∼D[h(x) 6=
g(x)] ≤ α. For classes of VC dimension d, uniform convergence results imply that any learning algorithm
that outputs g that is consistent with Sh will have this property for sample size m = O((d + log(1/β))/α
2).
This is the same bound as the one used in [DF18] and thus we get NRε,α,β,d = O˜(d/(εα)).
Theorem 2 follows from Lemma 8 by setting n = Θ˜(d2/(εα) + d/α2), n′ = Θ˜(d2/α), η = Θ˜(α/d). To
convert the prediction from (ε, εα)-private to ε-private we flip the value of the final output hS with probability
α (as in the proof of Corollary 1). The conditions in Lemma 8 have the following roles:
• n ≥ NGα,β,d is required for generalization (guaranteeing that the error relative to D is within α of the
error on S).
• n′ ≥ Nnetα,α,d is required to ensure that the sub-sampled set T is an α-net for H with probability 1− α.
This ensures that the hypothesis class HT contains an α-optimal hypothesis.
• n′ ≥ Nnetη,α,d + 1 guarantees that T ∩ T
′ is an η ≈ α/d-net.
• n ≥ N exp2/(ηn),α,τn(H) guarantees that the executed exponential mechanism is 2/(ηn)-differentially private
and α-approximate. The condition ε ≥ 1/(ηn) guarantees that the exponential mechanism is O(ε)-
differentially private.
• n ≥ NR1/(ηn),α,β,d guarantees that the PAC learning algorithm for the realizable case is 1/(ηn)-private
and (α, β)-approximate.
• n′ ≤ εn is required for privacy amplification by sub-sampling from O(1)-privacy to O(ε)-privacy.
We now prove that the algorithm we defined is an (O(α), O(β))-PAC learning algorithm.
Lemma 9. Under the conditions of Lemma 8 it holds that LD(hS) ≤ infh∈H LD(h) + 4α, with probability
at least 1− β.
Proof. Assume that I is a uniformly random subset of [n] of size n′. Since n′ ≥ Nnetα,α,d, with probability at
least 1− α over the choice of I:
min
h∈HSI
LS(h) ≤ inf
h∈H
LS(h) + α.
In particular,
E
I
[
min
h∈HSI
LS(h)
]
≤ inf
h∈H
LS(h) + 2α,
where I is a uniformly random subset.
Next, let h′S,SI denote the output of the exponential mechanism on HSI , namely
h′S,SI =
1
Z
∑
h∈HSI
λhh.
Since the exponential mechanism is defined as α-approximate, it holds that LS(h
′
S,SI
) ≤ minh∈HSI LS(h)+α.
Recall the assumption that n = Ω((d+log(1/β))/α2), or, equivalently, n ≥ NGα,β,d. This, combining with
the previous two steps, imply that with probability 1− β:
E
I
[LD(h
′
S,SI )] ≤ E
I
[LS(h
′
S,SI )] + α ≤ E
I
[
min
h∈HSI
LS(h)
]
+ 2α ≤ inf
h∈H
LS(h) + 4α ≤ inf
h∈H
LD(h) + 5α. (11)
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To go from h′S,SI to hS,SI , note that hS,SI = ϕS(h
′
S,SI
). From n ≥ NRε,α,β,d it follows that with probability
≥ 1−β: LD(ϕS(h)) ≤ LD(h)+α for all h ∈ H . In particular, LD(hS,SI ) ≤ LD(h
′
S,SI
)+α. This and Eq. (11)
imply that with probability ≥ 1− 2β,
LD(hS) = E
I
[LD(hS,SI )] ≤ E
I
[LD(h
′
S,SI )] + α ≤ infh∈H
LD(h) + 6α.
The rest of this section is dedicated to proving that the algorithm is (O(ε), O(εα))-private. Fix S and
let S′ be a set which is obtained from S by replacing one sample. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that S′ is obtained from S by replacing (x1, y1) with (x
′
1, y
′
1). Our goal is to show that
hS =
1(
n
n′
) ∑
|I|=n′
hS,SI  e
O(ε)hS′ +O(εα).
We will divide the summation over subsets |I| = n′ into three terms. Let I denote the set of all such
subsets, and we will partition it to I ′, I ′′ and I ′′′ as follows:
• I ′: all subsets satisfying 1 /∈ I, namely, those that do not correspond to the changed point (x1, y1).
• I ′′: those that satisfy 1 ∈ I, and that samples with indices in I \ {1} are not an η-net for H with
respect to the uniform distribution over S{2,...,n}. There are not many such sets: from the requirements
|I \ {1}| = n′ − 1 ≥ Nnetη,α,d and n
′ ≤ εn, it follows that |I ′′| ≤ α|I \ I ′| = α|I|n′/n ≤ αε|I|.
• I ′′′: the remaining sets. With respect to these, we will be able to perform the matching discussed in
the proof outline.
Next, we will show prediction privacy of hS,SI with respect to I, for I ∈ I
′′′:
Lemma 10. Let I ∈ I ′′′. Fix i ∈ [n] \ I, and let I ′ = (I \ {1}) ∪ {i}. Then,
hS,SI  4e
6hS,SI′ = 4e
6hS,S′
I′
. (12)
Proof. Note that the equality in Eq. (12) follows from the fact that 1 /∈ I ′ and that S and S′ differ only
on the first sample. Hence, we prove the inequality. We will create a matching between HSI and HSI′ as
follows: for any h ∈ HSI , let Ph denote the set of all hypotheses g ∈ HSI′ that satisfy h(xj) = g(xj) for all
j ∈ I \ {1}. Intuitively, Ph is the set of hypotheses matched with h, and it holds that 1 ≤ |Ph| ≤ 2.
We will fix h ∈ HSI and g ∈ Ph. Since I ∈ I
′′′, I\{1} is an η-net with respect to S{2,...,n}. From definition
of η nets (Section 2.1), since h and g agree on I \{1}, there are at most η(n−1) indices j ∈ [n]\{1} for which
h(xj) 6= g(xj). Hence, the number of samples (x, y) ∈ S for which h(x) 6= g(x) is at most η(n− 1)+ 1 ≤ 2ηn
(we used that 1 ≤ 1/ε ≤ ηn). This implies the following properties:
• It immediately follows that |LS(h)− LS(g)| ≤ 2η.
• Let λh and λg denote the coefficients of h and g in the exponential weight mechanism corresponding
to the definitions of hS,SI and hS,SI′ , respectively (as defined in Eq. (8)). We will bound λh in terms
of λg:
λh = e
−LS(h)/η ≤ e−LS(g)/η+2 = λge
2.
• Let ZI and ZI′ denote the values of Z in the definitions of hS,SI and hS,SI′ , respectively. It holds that
ZI =
∑
h∈HSI
λh ≤ e
2
∑
h∈HSI
∑
g∈Ph
λg ≤ 2e
2
∑
g∈HS
I′
λg = 2e
2ZI′ ,
using the fact that for any g ∈ HSI′ , there exist at most two hypotheses h ∈ HSI for which g ∈ Ph.
Similarly, one can derive ZI′ ≤ 2e
2ZI .
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• We will compare ϕS(h) with ϕS(g). Recall that ϕS(h) is the output of a 1/(ηn)-private realizable
learner on the training set Sh (and similarly for ϕS(g) and Sg). Since h and g predict differently on at
most 2ηn samples from S, Sh and Sg differ on at most 2ηn entries, hence ϕS(h)  (e
1/(ηn))2ηnϕS(g) =
e2ϕS(g).
Combining the above inequalities, one obtains that
hS,SI =
1
ZI
∑
h∈HSI
λhϕS(h) 
2e6
ZI′
∑
h∈HSI
∑
g∈Ph
λgϕS(g) 
4e6
ZI′
∑
g∈HS
I′
λgϕS(g) = 4e
6hS,SI′ .
Using an adaptation of amplification by sub-sampling (discussed in Section 2.1) and using Lemma 10,
one can bound the summation over I ∈ I ′′′:∑
I∈I′′′
1(
n
n′
)hS,SI  ∑
I∈I′′′
∑
i∈[n]\I
4e6
(n− n′)
(
n
n′
)hS,S′
(I\{1})∪{i}

∑
J∈I
4e6n′
(n− n′)
(
n
n′
)hS,S′
J

∑
J∈I
O(ε)(
n
n′
) hS,S′
J
,
where we used Lemma 10 and the facts that n′ ≤ εn and n− n′ ≥ n− εn ≥ n/2. This implies that
hS =
∑
I∈I′
1(
n
n′
)hS,SI + ∑
I∈I′′
1(
n
n′
)hS,SI + ∑
I∈I′′′
1(
n
n′
)hS,SI

1(
n
n′
) ∑
J∈I
hS,S′
J
+O(εα) +
O(ε)(
n
n′
) ∑
J∈I
hS,S′
J
, (13)
using the derived bound |I ′′| ≤ εα|I|. To conclude the proof, it suffices to bound hS,S′
J
in terms of hS′,S′
J
.
Lemma 11. Fix a subset T ⊆ X of size n′. Then, hS,T  e
3εhS′,T .
Proof. For any h ∈ HT , let λh,S and λh,S′ denote the values of λh in the definition of hS,T and hS′,T ,
respectively. Similarly, define ZS and ZS′ . Note the following:
λh,S = e
−LS(h)/η ≤ e−LS′(h)/η+1/(ηn) = λh,S′e
1/(ηn) ≤ eελh,S′ ,
where we used the condition 1/(ηn) ≤ ε. The same calculation implies that λh,S′ ≤ e
ελh,S , hence ZS ≥
e−εZS′ . Next, since A
R
1/(ηn),α,H has 1/(ηn)-private prediction, it holds that ϕS(h)  e
1/(ηn)ϕS′(h) 
eεϕS′(h). The proof concludes, by plugging λh,S ≤ e
ελh,S′ , ZS ≥ e
−εZS′ and ϕS(h)  e
εϕS′(h) in the
definition of hS,T .
The proof of Lemma 8 now follows from Lemma 11 and Eq. (13):
hS  (1 +O(ε))
1(
n
n′
) ∑
J∈I
hS,S′
J
+O(εα)  (1 +O(ε))e3ε
1(
n
n′
) ∑
J∈I
hS′,S′
J
+O(εα) = (1 +O(ε))e3εhS′ +O(εα).
5 Proof of Theorem 4
By the definition of the VC dimension, there exists a subset X ′ ⊆ X of size |X ′| = d such that the restriction
of H to X ′ contains all binary functions over X ′, and assume without loss of generality that X ′ = {1, . . . , d}.
Define a distribution DX′ over X
′ as follows: for any k ∈ {1, . . . , d − 1}, DX′(k) = 4α/(d − 1) and
DX′(d) = 1 − 4α. For any hypothesis h : X
′ → {0, 1}, let Dh be the following distribution over pairs
(x, y) ∈ X ′×Y : first, x ∼ DX′ is drawn, then y = h(x). Let D
n
h denote the distribution over n i.i.d. samples
from Dh.
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Given S = ((xi, yi))
n
i=1, denote by S
flip(k) the set obtained from S by flipping all values yi corresponding
to xi = k, namely S
flip(k) = ((xi, y
′
i))
n
i=1 where y
′
i = 1 − yi if xi = k and otherwise y
′
i = yi. Let #S(i) :=
|{i ∈ [n] : xi = k}| denote the number of times that k appears in S.
Drawing h : X ′ → {0, 1} uniformly at random, we obtain the following:
α ≥ E
h
E
S∼Dn
h
[LDh(A(S))] = E
h
E
S∼Dn
h
[
d∑
k=1
DX′(k) |h(k)−A(S)(k)|
]
≥
4α
d− 1
d−1∑
k=1
E
h
E
S∼Dn
h
[|h(k)−A(S)(k)|]
=
4α
d− 1
d−1∑
k=1
E
h
E
S∼Dn
h
[
1
2
|h(k)−A(S)(k)|+
1
2
∣∣∣(1− h(k))−A(Sflip(k))(k)∣∣∣] (14)
≥
2α
d− 1
d−1∑
k=1
E
h
E
S∼Dn
h
[∣∣∣(2h(k)− 1) +A(Sflip(k))(k)−A(S)(k)∣∣∣] (15)
≥
2α
d− 1
d−1∑
k=1
E
h
E
S∼Dn
h
[
|2h(k)− 1| −
∣∣∣A(S)(k) −A(Sflip(k))(k)∣∣∣] (16)
=
2α
d− 1
d−1∑
k=1
E
h
E
S∼Dn
h
[
1−
∣∣∣A(S)(k)−A(Sflip(k))(k)∣∣∣]
≥
2α
d− 1
d−1∑
k=1
(1− γ E
h
E
S∼Dn
h
[#S(k)]) (17)
= 2α(1 − γ
4α
d− 1
n),
where Eq. (14) follows from a change of measure argument, Eq. (15) and Eq. (16) follow from the triangle
inequality and Eq. (17) follows from the fact that A is γ-stable. We obtain that 1 − 4γαn/(d − 1) ≤ 1/2
which implies that n ≥ (d− 1)/(8γα) as required.
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